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11 Introduction
In his testimony to the senate on february 16 2005, Alan Greenspan used
the word conundrum to describe the behavior of long-term interest rates.
He used this term to coin the fact that long-term rates and short-term rates
diverged. This divergence posed a conundrum for various reasons. First of
all, the expectations hypothesis suggests that short and longer term rates
should move together. Moreover energy prices were rising early 2005, while
the federal scal position was deteriorating. All these factors were expected
to lead to higher long-term interest rates yet this expectation remained
unfullled.
The conundrum drew the attention of practitioners, academics and pol-
icy makers. Each seeking to explain this behavior. In academic circles, the
conundrum was among others investigated by Rudebusch et al. (2006) and
Backus and Wright (2007). To get a grip on the issue it is insightful to look
at Figure 1 in which we have plotted the federal funds rate, the short-term
interest rates and the long-term interest rates from 1981 onwards. We see
that the bond yield conundrum is clearly indicated in the picture by the con-
vergence of the long-term interest rates and the short-term interest rates.
While the federal funds rate rose from 1 percent in June 2004 to 4.2 percent
in December 2005, the rates on the 10-year U.S. Treasures remained fairly
sTable and even diminished by 0.2 percent until a level of 4.5 percent over
the same period.
As noted by some observers, such interest rate behavior is not unique, see
for example Cochrane (2007). The conundrum lies in the combination of the
dierent macro-economic ingredients. The mix of rising energy prices, the
deteriorating scal budget, the robust economic expansion together with
2the behavior of the interest rates is what made Greenspan use the word
conundrum.
In this study we investigate this phenomenon by setting up a simple
macro-nance model building upon the work of Rudebusch et al. (2006). We
use a similar 
exible macro-nance model with observable macro factors and
no latent factors. We improve the model in terms of the t by adapting the
state variables. Within this framework we test some popular explanations
while taking the state of the economy into account.
2 A general macro-nance framework
Our model is similar to one of the models used in Rudebusch et al. (2006)
which these authors in turn borrowed from Bernanke et al. (2004). It is a
macro-nance model with macro-economic factors as driving sources of vari-
ation and with the no-arbitrage assumption imposed. This type of models
was put forward in a seminal article by Ang and Piazzesi (2003). The reader
interested in a solid motivation is referred to that article. In all fairness, we
should admit that this type of modeling has its own weaknesses too. Some
important limitations are 1) the necessary low number of state variables, 2)
the dicult to optimize likelihood function, 3) the implied homoskedastic
yields, 4) the risk of overtting. A good and in-depth discussion was written
by Kim (2007). We discuss some of the major criticisms in the nal section.
This approach allows a comparison with previous literature on the bond
yield conundrum.
The general model as described in Ang and Piazzesi (2003) consists of 4
key ingredients which we rst brie
y present and then combine in subsection
2.5.
32.1 State dynamics
Assume that we have observable macro economic variables Ft. The vector
Ft follows a Gaussian VAR(p) process:1
Ft = 0 + 1Ft 1 +  + t p + ut (1)
with ut  IID N(O;
) and i denoting the coecientmatrix i with appro-
priate dimensions.
The dynamics can be rewritten in the following compact form:
Xt =  + Xt 1 + t (2)
with t = (uo
tO(:)1uu
t )0 and  containing blocks of zeros to accommodate
lags in Ft.
2.2 Short-rate equation
The one-period short rate rt is taken to be an ane function of the state
variables:
rt = 0 + 0
1Xt (3)
with 0 a scalar and 1 a (:)  1 vector.




t ) with f
o
t denoting the observ-
able variables and f
u
t denoting the latent variables.
42.3 The price of risk
The market prices of risk arising because of uncertainty t are denoted by
t and is parametrized as an ane process:
t = 0 + 1Xt: (4)
With 0;1 equal to 0 we have risk-neutral investors and no correction for
risk. By allowing 0;1 to take values dierent from 0, we can allow for
constant or time-varying risk premia.
2.4 Pricing Kernel
The crucial assumption in this model is the assumption of no arbitrage which
guarantees the existence of an equivalent martingale measure Q such that the
price of any (non dividend paying) asset Vt satises Vt = E
Q
t (exp( rt)Vt+1).
The Radon-Nikodym derivative is denoted by t+1 so we have for any random
variable Zt+1 that E
Q
t Zt+1 = Et(t+1Zt+1)=t. We assume that the Radon-
Nikodym derivative follows a log-normal process:






with t as in 2.3.





Substituting (3) and (5) into this expression yields the following expres-






tt+1   0   0
1Xt): (7)
2.5 Bond prices
The no arbitrage condition which links bonds of dierent maturities implies
a stochastic discount and links the price of these through Et(mt+1Rt+1) = 1.
Let pn
t denote the price of an n-period zero coupon bond. For the one-period
bond we have then p1
t = Et[mt+1] = exp( rt), substituting (3) for rt yields
p1
t = exp( 0   0Xt). We write  A1 =  0 and  B1 =  1. Through
induction (see appendix) we obtain:
pn
t = exp(  An +  Bn
0Xt) (8)
For a derivation of the likelihood function to estimate this model we refer
to Ang and Piazzesi (2003).
3 The model
The model we use is similar to the Bernanke-Reinhart-Sack model (BRS)
used in Rudebusch et al. (2006) in the sense that our model is also a model
with observable macro-economic state variables. All the variation is driven
by observable macro-economic factors; there are no latent variables in our
setup. This allows forecasting of the entire yield curve as function of the
observable variables designated as underlying variables. This specication
diers from most models in the macro-nance literature as it identies the
underlying factors that characterize the term structure by means of observ-
able indicators of macroeconomic conditions and the stance of monetary
6policy. The dynamics of the underlying factors are modeled with a vector
autoregression in ve observable variables:
 Real activity, which we obtained by the rst principal component ex-
tracted from a set of industrial production indices2.
 Monetary base, which we measure as the principal component ex-
tracted from a set of measures for the depository reserves.
 The Blue Chip survey of in
ation expectations of the coming year as
a measure of in
ation expectations.
 The federal funds rate, to capture the current stance of the Federal
Reserve.
 The rate on the Eurodollar futures contracts with four quarters to
expiration.
The last three macro-economic variables are exactly the same as in Rude-
busch et al. (2006). Finding a good measure of real productivity is dicult.
Based on the expanding literature on the use of large datasets, see for exam-
ple Marcellino et al. (2005) or Bernanke et al. (2005) , we prefer to extract
a productivity measure from disaggregated indices instead of using the de-
viation of employment from the trend (using a Hodrick-Prescott lter) like
in the original BRS formulation.
Following Ang and Piazzesi (2003), Bernanke et al. (2004) and Rude-
busch et al. (2006) we estimate this model in two stages to reduce the num-
ber of parameters that have to be estimated.3 In a rst stage, we estimate
2A detailed description of the variables can be found in the appendix.
3We sincerely thank Eric Swanson for providing us with the data and the code from his
study with Glenn Rudebusch and Tao Wu. As reported in that study, the authors were
able to improve signicantly upon Bernanke et al. (2004) in terms of tting the model.
7a vector autoregression with the ve macroeconomic variables and four lags
over the 1984-2005 period. In the choice of the number of lags we follow
Bernanke et al. (2004). In a second stage we estimate the risk loadings (see
equation 4) with the vector autoregression coecients xed using nonlinear
least squares. The model is estimated to closely match the 6-month, 1-year,
2-year, 3-year, 4-year, 5-year, 7-year and 10-year yields with equal weights
on these maturities. This is important because putting a larger weight on
the long end of the yield curve would favor our estimation results.
The results of the rst stage estimation is graphically represented in
Figure 2.
The impulse response functions reveal some interesting dynamics. Let us
focus on the eects of production and especially depository reserves, a state
variable which is a bit less common in these studies. A shock in production
(rst column) yields a hump shaped response function on the year-ahead
Eurodollar rate and the federal funds rate, while the eect on the other
state variables is closer to a geometric decay. The eect of a shock in the
depository base (second column) gives more peculiar behavior. Such a shock
induces some volatility on the Eurodollar rate in the short run, after which
the Eurodollar rate returns to its earlier level. The eect on production and
Blue Chip in
ation expectations seems more long term.
Now to the estimated risk loadings which are presented in Table 1.
The risk loadings on some factors seem very large but one needs to keep
in mind that the scaling of the dierent variables is not really comparable.
Moreover if we look at Table 2, we see that the variables with the larger
risk coecients have relatively lower variance so the net eect on bond
prices is not as large as a quick glance on Table 1 would suggest. To have
a proper idea of the size of the impact of the dierent factors we should
8perform a variance decomposition of the long-term premium on the ve
stochastic shocks . However a drawback of our model is that the setup does
not really allow for a proper decomposition. At those longer horizons the
term premium is highly nonlinear and a direct computation of the variance
decomposition becomes infeasible.4 An approximation by the delta method
is likely to yield poor approximations, see also Rudebusch et al. (2006).
How well does this model perform in terms of t? Table 3 suggests that
it performs signicantly better then the results obtained by Rudebusch et al.
(2006) with a root mean squared error which is on average about 20% lower.
So use a broader measure of real activity and a measure of monetary base
leads to a signicant imporvement.
3.1 Towards explaining the Conundrum
Given the tight t we obtained, we can focus our attention to the sample
period of interest. We start out by plotting the 10-year zero-coupon US
treasury yield curve along with yield curve implied by our model. This plot,
shown in Figure 3, shows the actual yield curve in green, the model implied
Treasury yield in blue, the model implied risk-neutral rate in red and the
model implied term premium in cyan. The risk-neutral rate is the estimated
yield curve under the hypothesis that risk is not priced i.e. where the prices
of risk are always equal to zero. This corresponds to 0 and 1 restricted
to zero (see equation 4). The state variables are in this case governed by
the rst stage VAR of which we have plotted the impulse response functions
in Figure 2. The model implied Treasury yield is the estimated yield curve
when the prices of risk are no longer restricted to zero, but are an ane
4As noted in Rudebusch et al. (2006), this exercise amounts to minimizing a 10years 
12months = 120th-degree polynomial.
9function of the macroeconomic variables. It follows that the term premium
is the dierence between those two lines and should be interpreted as the
estimated term premium on the 10-year zero-coupon bond at each point in
time.
Figure 3 displays the t of our model. The blue and green line move
very closely together which is consistent with the low RMSE's. Our model
captures the downward trend and the high-frequency swings. One may
be tempted to dismiss this result as merely the result of overtting the
data. We believe that this is not the case for two reasons. First of all, the
optimization placed equal weight on all maturities considered and did not
put too much weight on the long end. Secondly, our model does not contain

exible latent factors (level, slope, curvature) like most other macro-nance
models, which are able to absorb a lot of variability. In our model the
movements are entirely based on the variability in observable macro variables
under the no arbitrage assumption. While this model is autoregressive and
nonstructural with a large parameter set, the no arbitrage assumption puts
some restrictions on the model. Figure 3 reveals for the ten year rates
both the term premium and the risk-neutral yield curve have fallen over the
sample, respectively with 230 and 330 basis points. Also the importance of
the term premium has diminished over the sample. In Figure 4 we plot the
residuals of our model.
Figure 4 reveals that despite the model's excellent t, there are periods
in which the t was worse. To make this precise, while the average error
was 62 basis points, the largest error (in absolute value) was 78 basispoints.
There are several occasions in which the model ts the data poorly but
these periods were briefer (1991) and milder (1997-1999). Moreover, if we
look at the relative size of the residuals, the dierence between 2004-2005
10and earlier periods becomes really remarkable. Inspection of Figures 3 and
4 reveals that on average the residuals are about a twentieth of the level
of the 10-year treasury yield while around 2005 the residuals amounted to
nearly a seventh of the level of the yield curve. These results reveal the
conundrum. Despite its excellent t, the 2004-2005 period is dicult to
explain with a general purpose macro-nance model. In the next section we
take the analysis one step further by trying to identify factors that might
be related to the residuals in our model.
4 Exploring the residuals
The macro-nance model presented above was not able to resolve the co-
nundrum. This was clearly visible in Figure 4 where the residuals were
relatively large during the conundrum period. The number of factors that
we can consider within the macro-nance model is limited because tting
the model becomes increasingly more complex as the numbers of parameters
increase. Since we only allowed for observable variables we needed to include
variables which capture the bulk of the variation. In this section we look for
variables outside our macro-nance model which may help explaining the
conundrum.
There are three categories of variables we are going to consider. First of
all we test for variables which were previously considered in the literature.
Then we test for some additional variables loosely motivated by readings
in press reports. Finally we also consider the importance of the state of
the economy when identifying relevant variables. Conditioning on the state
of the economy has been absent in the discussion of the bond yield conun-
drum so far. However, recent empirical studies on asset prices, for example
11Boyd et al. (2005), have shown that the state of the economy matters a
lot. Conditioning on the state of the economy may be important in so far
that candidate explanatory variables might dier in importance along the
business cycle.
We start out by univariate regressions in which we regress dierent ex-
planatory variables on the residuals from our macro-nance model. Then
we proceed with multivariate regressions in which we test for the best can-
didates obtained from the univariate regressions.
4.1 Regression analysis
Previous explanations for the bond yield conundrum based their choice of
explanatory variables on a survey conducted by the rm Macroeconomic Ad-
visors. This survey of market participants and business economists was held
in early March 2005 and asked the respondents to provide their view on the
low-level of long-term rates. The survey identied the following seven factors
(the number between parentheses indicates a rough estimate of how much
each factor was perceived to have lowered the bond yield in basis points):
1] demand by foreign central banks (21), 2] increased demand by pension
funds (11), 3] reaching for yield (10), 4] minimal in
ation risk (10), 5] greater
transparency by the Fed (8), 6] excess global savings (8), 7] low economic
growth volatility (7). The largest factor according to the respondents was
the increased demand for US long-term securities by foreign central banks.
The other six explanations also make sense. The second largest factor re-
lates to an expected rise in the demand for long-term securities of pension
funds to better match the duration of their assets to their liabilities. This
is, however, dicult to quantify. Similarly the next two factors which re-
12late to the risk appetite of investors are dicult to quantify. Also greater
transparency of the Fed is dicult to incorporate in our analysis. There is
a rich literature on central bank transparency and recently there were some
indices developed for this purpose, see for example the study by Eijnger
and Geraats (2006). Unfortunately these indices are not entirely t for our
purposes as these variables are at a lower frequency.
The rst group of explanatory variables is similar to those in Rudebusch
et al. (2006). Two measures of nancial market volatility: (1) The Mer-
rill Lynch Move Index to measure the implied volatility in the longer-term
U.S. treasury market. This index is a weighted average of a wide range of
outstanding options on the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year U.S. treasury
securities with weights of 0:2, 0:2, 0:4, 0:2 respectively. (2) The VIX measure
of implied volatility from options on the S&P 500 index. The rst measure
relates to uncertainty in the Treasury market, the second to uncertainty in
the stock market.
Macroeconomic uncertainty is proxied by two variables. Volatility of the
growth rate of GDP and volatility of the core PCE de
ator.5
Additionally we explore the explanatory power of the following variables.
The motivation for these was given by the macroeconomic conditions during
the bond yield conundrum. A rst variable is the volatility of oil prices as a
proxy for uncertainty about energy prices. Oil prices were steeply rising in
2004-2005 and this rise was receiving increasing attention in the media. But
rising energy prices tend to work against the behavior of the bond yields we
observed in 2004-2005. This raises the question whether there was a role
played by the volatility rather than the level of oil prices. A next variable
5We measure volatility by calculating the rolling standard deviation. Details are pro-
vided in the appendix.
13we consider is related to net government spending. We test for the impact of
the uncertainty around the growth rates of net government spending. Gov-
ernment spending was very large in the period under scrutiny. With the
scal situation of the U.S. steadily deteriorating, uncertainty related to the
growth rate of spending might became more of a concern to investors in long-
term bonds. Admittedly, this argument is a bit far fetched given the AAA
rating of US treasuries but the 2010 turmoil in the European bond markets
show that there is a link between the scal situation of a country and its long
term nancing through bonds -even for the U.S. We also test for uncertainty
among the consumers by taking volatility in consumer expectations -as mea-
sured by the Michigan consumer survey- as an explanatory variable. Next
we consider the U.S. credit market by taking both the volatility of all out-
standing consumer credit in the United States and the volatility of all loans
by commercial banks (industrial and commercial) as regressors. Finally we
investigate whether there was an in
uence of the Chinese economy. The cur-
rent chairman of the Federal Reserve, Benjamin Bernanke, once pointed to
the role of the Chinese economy in a famous speech in which he introduced
the term global savings glut, see Bernanke (2005). Instead of considering the
level of the Chinese growth rates, we used the volatility in these growth rates
to capture the uncertainty surrounding the Chinese growth path.
To have an idea on how these variables comove it is instructive to look at
Table 4. The Table indicates that the variables are related little correlated
and multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem later on in our multivariate
regressions. Only 8 out of the 55 correlations are larger than 0.4.
We regressed all these variables individually against the residuals, the
results can be found in the Table below. A detailed description of the
explanatory variables can be found in the appendix.
14The univariate regressions deliver four variables with explanatory power;
the MOVE index, Oil price volatility, volatility of outstanding consumer
credit and the GDP growth volatility. The volatility of the growth in the
Chinese GDP and the volatility of loans by commercial banks are also sta-
tistically signicant but seem to have low explanatory power.
Based on the univariate results, we have estimated multivariate regres-
sions but we do not consider the explanatory variables with a t-value (in
absolute value) below 2. The models we have estimated are the following:
Residt =  +
6 X
i=1
ivarit + t (9)
Residt =  +
6 X
i=1




ivarit  (1   RPt) + t (10)
The model represented by equation (9) is a multivariate regression with
as independent variables vari the six signicant variables from the univari-
ate regressions above: the MOVE index, Oil price volatility, GDP growth
volatility, volatility of outstanding consumer credit, volatility of Chinese
GDP growth, volatility of loans by banks. The model represented by equa-
tion (10) is a similar multivariate regression in which we interact each vari-
able with a recession indicator and its complement, respectively. A similar
specication was used in Basistha and Kurov (2008) to gauge the impact of
the state of the economy. The recession probability, denoted by RPt, was
obtained from Chauvet and Piger (2008).
The results can be found in Table 6. Model 1 corresponds to regression
equation 9 and model 2 corresponds to regression equation 10. Bull cor-
responds to RPt and Bear (1   RPt). Instead of simple dummy variables,
15these are recession probabilities. By interacting the variables with Bear or
Bull we can gauge the eects of these variables across the business cycle.
Given the time-series nature of the data, we used Newey-West errors. The
reported t-statistics are based on these errors.
In the rst multivariate specication, only three variables have explana-
tory power at the 5% condence level, each with the expected sign. The
signs on GDP growth volatility and the MOVE index are as expected and
in line with the results of Rudebusch et al. (2006). Lower macroeconomic
volatility is associated with lower yields on long-term Treasury securities.
The same goes for the MOVE index. The negative coecient on the volatil-
ity of oil prices indicates this uncertainty is inversely related to the long-term
yields.
In the second specication (equation 10) we allow for dierent eects
depending on the state of the economy. Surprisingly, the eects of the three
important variables of regression (9) are only important in Bullish markets
and are insignicant during a downturn. But, during Bearish markets the
volatility of loans by commercial banks becomes signicant. The coecient
on this variable is remarkably large in comparison with the univariate re-
gressions. Taking the state of the economy into account certainly matters
for this variable.
Now we are ready to answer the question on how much these explanatory
variables can explain the remaining conundrum. We do this by decomposing
the decline of bond yields between June 2004 and June 2005 according to
the regression results presented in Table 6. June 2004 is chosen as the
starting point because that month is most often cited as the beginning of
the conundrum. Over this sample, the observed 10-year yields dropped
by 77:7 basis points whereas the macro-nance model implied changes in
16the risk-neutral yield and term premium of 17:99 and 14:31 basis points,
respectively.
The rst row in Table 7 shows the dierence we seek to explain. The
subsequent rows indicate to what extent this dierence can be explained
on the basis of our regressions. The results are disappointing. Only a
little more than 14% can be explained. The unexplained part of the model
implied residuals are larger than the observed drop in basis points. This
is the crux of the conundrum. The macro economic environment, captured
by the state variables in our macro-nance model, normally leads to higher
long-term rates. Within our model this would be an increase of about 32.3
basis points. Instead we observed a decrease over the period under scrutiny.
The alternative explanatory variables we proposed only explain a small part
of the gap between what we observed and what the macro-nance model
suggests.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the bond yield conundrum. Building on the work
of Rudebusch et al. (2006) we have tried to test some alternative hypothe-
ses. Despite our improvements in terms of t to the model by Bernanke
et al. (2004) the 2005 conundrum is still a mystery. The conundrum is an
interesting topic to study as it is a period for which the current generation
of macro-nance models seem to have diculties to grasp the behavior of
the yield curve. The model we used in this paper is appealing because it
does not use latent factors. It therefore allows us to relate the yield curve
behavior to macro factors only. This task proved to be dicult. The likeli-
hood function is highly nonlinear and not easy to handle. This problem was
17explained in more detail by Kim (2007).
Although our decomposition of the results delivered less spectacular re-
sults than we hoped for, some interesting lessons can be drawn. Most im-
portantly we feel that conditioning on the state of the economy is important.
Variables which may be unimportant in general, may prove to be important
in certain periods.
We have done an extensive study and at best we nd variables which
explain a modest part of the conundrum. We feel that further research
should focus on putting more structure on the model. A particular interest-
ing approach was recently proposed by Ang et al. (2005) where the authors
introduce Taylor-rules in the macro-nance model. Another way may con-
sist of introducing regime shifts. Bansal and Zhou (2002) provide strong
evidence that a regime-switching model can deal with the violations of the
expectations hypothesis. These regime switches are intimately related to
the business cycle. Finally, one could also consider relaxing the Gaussian
nature of most macro-nance models by incorporating heteroskedastic dy-
namics parameterized by discretized square-root processes as was suggested
in Ang and Piazzesi (2003).
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20A Appendix: derivation of bond prices
Proof. Basis: The statement holds for the case n = 0 because rewriting
p1
t in terms of  At and  Bt gives p1
t = exp(   A1    B1
0Xt). Inductive step:







Using the identities (7), (8); substituting the compact form into the expres-
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Now recall that t is assumed to be iid and normally distributed with
E[t] = 0. Together with the assumptions on var[t] and t, this implies
0
tt = 0
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0(   0) + 1
2  Bn
00  Bn   0
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This nal expression is of the form (8) with  Ai and  Bi recursively dened
as:
 An+1 =  0 +  An +  Bn
0(   0) + 1
2  Bn
00  Bn
 Bn+1 =  Bn
0(   1)   0
1
(14)
21and  A1;  B1 as earlier.
Because the continuously compounded yield on a yn
t on an n-period zero-
coupon bond is given by  log(pn
t )=n, we have that yn
t =   1
n(  An+  Bn
0Xt).
Dene An :=    An=n, Bn :=    Bn=n and we obtain:
yn
t = An + B0
nXt: (15)
Since yields are ane functions of the state variables Xt, equation (15) can
be viewed as the observation equation of a state-space system. Because
lagged variables are state variables in our system (see 2.1), the ane form
is maintained.
B Appendix: Macro-economic variables
As mentioned in the text, three from the ve state variables are identical
to those uses by Bernanke et al. (2004). All data used for the new state
variables in our macro-nance model can be obtained trough the FRED
database. The series we used for the dierent variables are:
1. Production: This variable corresponds to the rst principal component
from the following set of variables: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX -
DURABLE CONSUMER GOODS; INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - NONDURABLE
CONSUMER GOODS; INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - BUSINESS EQUIPMENT;
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX - DURABLE GOODS MATERIALS; INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION INDEX - NONDURABLE GOODS MATERIALS; INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
INDEX - MANUFACTURING (SIC); INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION INDEX -
FUELS. The idea is that using disaggregated series allows for cross-
sectionally smoothing out noise in comparison with the use of an ag-
22gregate index, see for example Stock and Watson (2008).
2. Monetary Base: MONEY STOCK - M2; MONETARY BASE, ADJUSTED FOR
RESERVE REQUIREMENT CHANGES(SA).
The data used in the residual regressions where obtained through a va-
riety of sources:
1. MOVE index: freely available on the web (monthly frequency).
2. Oil price volatility: Oil prices were obtained through Datastream (Spot
Oil Price: West Texas Intermediate).
3. GDP growth volatility: The GDP growth data are available at quar-
terly frequency. We took these from Stock and Watson (2008). Growth
rates are the log of the year-on-year dierences. The volatility was
obtained by taking the standard deviation over the past 24 months
(quarterly frequency). Monthly observations were constructed by in-
terpolation (cubic spline).
4. Volatility of outstanding consumer credit. Consumer credit data is
available through the FRED database. The volatility was obtained
by taking the standard deviation over the past 12 months (monthly
frequency).
5. Macroeconomic data on the GDP of China was taken from a study
by Rajaguru and Abeysinghe (2004). The volatility was obtained by
taking the standard deviation over the past 24 months (quarterly fre-
quency). Monthly observations were constructed by interpolation (cu-
bic spline).
236. Volatility of loans by commercial banks. Consumer credit data is
available through the FRED database. The volatility was obtained
by taking the standard deviation over the past 12 months (monthly
frequency).
7. Volatility of PCE in
ation:: PCEin
ation was obtained through the
FRED database( Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-Type
Price Index Less Food and Energy ). The volatility measure was ob-
tained by taking the standard deviation of prices over the past 24
months (monthly frequency).
8. VIX index: Obtained through Datastream.
9. Investor sentiment: Obtained from the website of Wurgler. The sen-
timent index and related issues are discussed in Baker and Wurgler
(2007).
10. Volatility of net government spending. Net government spending was
obtained through the FRED database. The volatility was obtained
by taking the standard deviation over the past 24 months (quarterly
frequency). Monthly observations were constructed by interpolation
(cubic spline).
11. Volatility of expectations: The expectations are taken form the Michi-
gan Survey. The volatility measure was obtained by taking the stan-
dard deviation of prices over the past 12 months (monthly frequency).
The recession probabilities we used, were taken from Chauvet and Piger
(2008). The data are available on the website of Jeremy Piger.
24C Tables and gures
25Constant Loadings Matrix of factor loadings
-156.87 0.37 -6.81 11.80 -3.59 16.34
629.34 -1.45 30.99 -49.94 11.83 -62.10
520.05 -1.23 22.10 -33.89 1.64 -49.57
-62.03 0.15 -2.41 3.15 1.67 4.98
40.70 -0.10 1.45 -1.97 0.40 -4.51
Table 1: Model Risk Factor Loadings
1.3247 -0.0057 -0.0121 0.0021 0.0585
0 0.1645 0.0038 -0.0072 -0.0190
0 0 0.0860 0.0197 0.0437
0 0 0 0.1503 0.1103
0 0 0 0 0.3857
Table 2: Cholesky-factored residual variance.
Maturity RMSE our model RMSE model by Rudebusch et al. (2006)
Six Months 20.59 29.52
One Year 20.99 33.35
Two Years 21.42 26.98
Three Years 22.94 26.58
Four Years 25.14 27.78
Five Years 27.27 30.03
Seven Years 31.22 34.45
Ten Years 33.76 39.30
Average 25.46 31.00
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Variable Estimated Coecient T-statistic R2
Merrill Lynch Move Index 0.0079 4.5424 0.1656
Oil price volatility -0.0533 -3.9684 0.1184
GDP growth volatility 83.244 3.5634 0.0936
Volatility of outstanding consumer credit -7.5765 -2.8740 0.0831
Volatility of the growth of GDP China 0.0206 2.2279 0.029
Volatility of loans by commercial banks 7.73 1.6439 0.0256
VIX index 0.6108 1.6412 0.0148
Volatility of the PCE in
ation -0.1137 -1.0834 0.0117
Investor sentiment 0.025 0.7087 0.0026
Volatility of net government spending 1.1306 -0.6493 0.0023
Volatility of expectations -0.0036 -0.2935 0.0009
Table 5: Univariate regressions (the t-statistic between brackets), sample:
January 1990-December 2005.
28Variable Model 1 Model 2
Merrill Lynch Move Index 0.0059
(3.5265)
Merrill Lynch Move Index*Bull 0.0057
(3.2510)
Merrill Lynch Move Index*Bear 0.0066
(0.8027)
Oil price volatility -0.0335
(-2.4891)
Oil price volatility*Bull -0.0501
(-3.1168)
Oil price volatility*Bear 0.3342
(1.6080)
GDP growth volatility 77.9410
(4.0295)
GDP growth volatility*Bull 81.8979
(3.6321)
GDP growth volatility*Bear -754.0523
(-1.5078)
Volatility of outstanding consumer credit -3.4616
(-1.6074)
Volatility of outstanding consumer credit*Bull -3.9052
(-1.4110)
Volatility of outstanding consumer credit*Bear 32.5494
(1.6840)
Volatility of the growth of GDP China 0.0061
(0.6597)
Volatility of the growth of GDP China*Bull 0.0128
(1.3025)
Volatility of the growth of GDP China*Bear -0.1195
(-1.0618)
Volatility of loans by commercial banks 1.7969
(0.3952)
Volatility of loans by commercial banks*Bull -3.1693
(-0.7106)
Volatility of loans by commercial banks*Bear 50.6434
(2.5883)
R2 0.3373 0.3811
Table 6: Multivariate regressions (t-statistic between brackets ), sample:
January 1990-December 2005.
29Variables Model 1 Model 2
Change in model residuals -110 -110
Change in implied volatility on long-term Treasury rates -1.08
Change in realized oil price volatility -1.79
Change in realized GDP growth volatility -12.38
Change in implied volatility on long-term Treasury rates*Bull -1.10
Change in realized oil price volatility*Bull -2.43
Change in realized GDP growth volatility*Bull -13.16
Volatility of loans by commercial banks*Bear 1.30
Unexplained by above -94.75 -94.61
Table 7: A decomposition of the Bond yield conundrum (June 2004 - June
2005).
30Figure 1: Plot of the federal funds rate - FFR (dots), short-term interest
rates - 3M (dashed), long-term rates - 10Y (solid), monthly frequency: 1981-
2006.
31Figure 2: Impulse response functions of the 1st stage estimation.
32Figure 3: Long-term rates yield curve and model implied decomposition.
33Figure 4: Model residuals
34